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Abstract 
Today’s missions rely on highly integrated and complex technology that must be protected 
from a wide range of adversaries in a very dynamic and contested cyber environment. The 
predominant response to the growing, shifting cyber threat has been to apply cyber hygiene 
best practices and focus on satisfying compliance mandates for an authority to operate. 
While necessary, these steps alone are not sufficient, given the pace of technology change 
and the increasing abilities of our adversaries. 
For organizations developing or acquiring complex, software-enabled technologies, a 
cybersecurity strategy provides a critical set of guidelines that enable intelligent, risk-based 
decisions throughout the life cycle. The strategy identifies planning, design, monitoring, and 
enforcement considerations for integrating cybersecurity into all products, processes, and 
resources. As such, it defines expectations for how the individual technology components, 
their assembled configurations, and their interactions will meet the security requirements of a 
mission.  
Effective cybersecurity requires the application of engineering rigor to the process of defining 
security requirements in the context of other system imperatives. Cybersecurity engineering 
is a discipline focused on analyzing and managing mission and system cyber risk and trade-
offs across the life cycle. Cybersecurity engineers evaluate interactions, dependencies, and 
system response to attacks. They identify security practices and mechanisms that need 
coordination across the life cycle, spanning components, people, processes, and tools. They 
prepare the technology to handle the operational environment where it will ultimately reside. 
In this paper, we introduce the purpose of a cybersecurity strategy and describe the role of 
cybersecurity engineering in implementing it. We identify six key cybersecurity engineering 
activities and share observations on how these activities can be used to address the 
challenges acquisition programs face as they work to improve cybersecurity under resource 
and time constraints. 
A Strategy for Cybersecurity in Acquisition 
Most acquisition programs currently address cybersecurity by relying on a small 
cadre of security experts that is not adequately integrated into the acquisition and 
development life cycle. These security experts are often tasked to evaluate compliance with 
mandates and to assure good cyber hygiene. Called upon only to address security, they 
may have limited systems and software domain knowledge. 
While compliance mandates must be met for an authority to operate and good 
cybersecurity hygiene is necessary, these alone will not ensure sufficient security for a 
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mission. Today’s missions call for a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy, built and 
implemented with extensive collaboration among participants in a variety of roles throughout 
the life cycle.  
What Is an Effective Cybersecurity Strategy?  
A cybersecurity strategy is a critical element of an acquisition program’s Program 
Protection Plan (DoD, 2020), establishing a foundation for full life cycle cybersecurity 
assurance. An effective cybersecurity strategy defines acquisition and development life cycle 
activities, roles, and responsibilities essential to ensure the system can be fielded with an 
acceptable level of risk. The cybersecurity strategy identifies planning, design, monitoring, 
and enforcement considerations for integrating cybersecurity into technology at and across 
all levels of a system with a goal of exposing and removing  
• gaps that allow unexpected and unwanted interactions among components and 
between components and external systems. 
• weaknesses in the design and implementation that make the system vulnerable. 
• opportunities for processes or people to bypass controls, allowing attackers to impact 
mission success. 
To accomplish this goal, the cybersecurity strategy expands activities, roles, and 
responsibilities for a program’s cybersecurity experts far beyond compliance and hygiene, to 
owning and leading execution of the strategy itself. The strategy’s owner is responsible for 
defining how a system’s cybersecurity must perform to meet the system’s mission, even when 
under attack. These responsibilities include activities that achieve the following:1 
• Plan and design trusted relationships.  
• Negotiate appropriate security requirements to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability with sufficient monitoring in systems and software to identify problems. 
• Plan and design a system with sufficient resiliency to be able to recognize, resist, and 
recover from attacks. 
• Plan for operational security under all circumstances, including designed-in methods of 
denying critical information to an adversary to avoid or minimize mission impact. 
• Evaluate alternatives to select an acquisition option with an acceptable level 
cybersecurity risk. 
As is evident from this list of activities, building a cybersecurity strategy is a 
challenging effort that touches every aspect of the life cycle. Participants contributing to the 
strategy come with a variety of backgrounds and frequently, different vocabularies. They 
must build a shared understanding of the mission, how security risks can impact mission 
success, and the cybersecurity activities, roles, and responsibilities needed to mitigate the 
risks. More details about defining the cybersecurity strategy are available in the paper 
“Building a Cybersecurity Strategy” by Carol Woody and Robert Ellison, published in the 
Special Issue on Rigor and Inter-Disciplinary Communication of the Journal of Systemics, 
Cybernetics and Informatics (Woody & Ellison, 2020a). 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
1  Key elements of an effective cybersecurity strategy were introduced in a webcast delivered in November 2020 (Woody & 
Creel, 2020). 
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To effectively execute a cybersecurity strategy, a high level of collaboration is needed 
across acquisition and development roles. Cybersecurity engineering is a full life-cycle 
discipline that operationalizes the cybersecurity strategy and orchestrates collaboration 
across acquisition program stakeholders. The next section of this paper describes 
challenges in six key cybersecurity engineering activities related to strategy execution. 
Executing the Strategy: Cybersecurity Engineering Challenges 
Cybersecurity engineers are experts who own and lead execution of the 
cybersecurity strategy. They articulate the roles, responsibilities, and collaboration 
touchpoints across the life cycle needed to assure system security for the mission. Their 
knowledge and experience, a combination of operational security, systems engineering, and 
software engineering, is difficult to find, but increasing demand is stimulating interest and 
growth in the discipline. 
Cybersecurity engineers working on an acquisition program must understand 
systems, software, and cybersecurity. In addition, they must be sufficiently committed to the 
program to have impact. Attending occasional meetings is insufficient; rather, they must 
engage early in the life cycle to affect requirements and design trade-off analyses, risk 
assessments, and where possible, contract language. Focusing on code and other 
downstream artifacts—which most security analyses and verification tools target—is too 
little, too late. Flaws and weaknesses can be introduced early in the life cycle even before 
code is introduced. 
Finally, cybersecurity engineers must consider the overall engineering and 
operational context, the system’s engineering, operational, and sustainment environments. 
In addition to operational threats, sources of risk include software-enabled tools used to 
build, test, or maintain hardware, software, and firmware; communications between 
suppliers, and between acquirers and suppliers; and people who may unintentionally or 
intentionally compromise the acquisition program. Cybersecurity engineers develop and 
analyze scenarios for what could go wrong; recommend modifications to products, 
processes, and resources to mitigate risks; and monitor system development and 
verification to confirm that the system can withstand operational misuse and abuse. 
The following six key cybersecurity activities are important to executing the cybersecurity 
strategy:  
• determining risk 
• defining and monitoring system and component interactions  
• evaluating trusted dependencies 
• anticipating and planning responses to attacks 
• coordinating security throughout the life cycle 
• measuring to improve cybersecurity  
What Makes Effective Cybersecurity Engineering Challenging?  
Cybersecurity engineering is challenging because it attempts to change existing 
patterns in the way security’s role is perceived and executed on acquisition programs, and 
because it requires a combination of knowledge and expertise that is rare. Where 
cybersecurity engineers are found, they often represent a lone voice in a sea of technical 
experts and managers where they struggle for inclusion.  
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In the remainder of this section, we review the six key cybersecurity engineering 
activities, exploring challenges and lessons learned to date in changing existing patterns and 
increasing cybersecurity engineers’ involvement in early acquisition activities. We also share 
effective approaches we have seen in each of these areas that can help address the 
challenges. 
Challenges in Determining Risk 
Perceptions of risk drive assurance decisions, and the lack of cybersecurity expertise 
in acquisition and development risk analysis has led to poor assurance choices. Involving 
participants who have knowledge about successful attacks and how threats can impact a 
system’s operational mission can be very useful in the decision-making steps for 
determining appropriate prioritization. However, to effectively communicate cybersecurity 
issues to leadership and systems and software engineers in the program office, these 
participants must have more than a rudimentary understanding of the system and software 
acquisition and development life cycle.  
Risk considerations must start with good cybersecurity requirements, but simply 
providing a list of standards and policies—an approach too frequently used by programs—
does not ensure that risks to the specific mission and technology are addressed. New 
versions of standards and policies are now appearing so fast that programs have little time 
to respond to them; they then continue working with outdated versions until contract 
modifications can be made. We have also seen programs fail to establish even minimum 
cybersecurity or compliance requirements in the contract and the vendor plans to deliver a 
system that will not be implementable without contract modifications and further 
development. When developing good cybersecurity requirements, participants must do the 
following: 
1. understand how the many layers of technology to be implemented to address a mission 
can be compromised; 
2. define requirements that enable consideration of the broad and ever-increasing threat 
environment; 
3. clearly define how success will be verified. 
Requirements for many aspects of a system contribute to cybersecurity. The 
structure of these requirements affects how the vendor will respond. When requirements for 
anti-tamper, supply chain, information security, software assurance, cybersecurity, and 
safety controls are developed by independent teams that do not collaborate, the contractor 
cannot clearly propose a system that meets what could be conflicting needs. The vendor will 
make choices based on their perspective, which will likely differ from the intent of the 
program. Adjustments must be made later in the life cycle as time and funding permit, and 
the results will vary widely depending on the knowledge of the decision makers involved at 
each subsequent stage. Security teams are usually too small to support all of the 
interactions needed for this approach to cybersecurity risk decision-making. 
In many cases, the cybersecurity risks and potential mission impacts of choices 
made in design and engineering are not well understood by system and software engineers 
who (1) were not trained in cybersecurity and (2) do not understand the capabilities of 
attackers in the contested environment where the systems are fielded. The program too 
frequently accepts risks without understanding the mission impact. 
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Challenges for Defining and Monitoring System and Component Interactions  
In systems design, we see engineers rush to decompose the system into technology 
components and delegate requirements to these various pieces. Interface protocols and 
application programming interfaces (APIs) are defined to provide mechanisms for data 
sharing among components. Cybersecurity controls are selected from a wide array of 
sources and sprinkled like “fairy dust” among the components. However, nowhere is there a 
coherent plan for how the overall system cybersecurity will operate across the attack surface 
of the system. Views of the hardware, network interfaces, software interfaces, and mission 
capabilities are provided, but the operational aspects of cybersecurity are fragmented. 
To address this void, programs must define how the technology will support mission 
execution and evaluate how information flows and data exchanges can be attacked. To 
conduct a cyber-threat analysis of a system, we applied the Security Engineering Risk 
Analysis (SERA) Method (Alberts et al., 2014). The SERA Method defines a scenario-based 
approach for analyzing complex security risks in software-reliant systems and systems of 
systems. The SERA Method incorporates a variety of models that can be analyzed at any 
point in the life cycle to (1) identify security threats and vulnerabilities and (2) construct 
security risk scenarios. An organization can use those scenarios to evaluate whether 
planned controls will be sufficient and focus its limited resources on enhancing how to meet 
the needs of mitigating the most significant remaining security risks.  
For the most part, we see programs failing to assemble the information they have in 
ways that enable their overall cybersecurity to be evaluated. System and software 
engineering analysis does not consider the real threats and the ways their designs and 
selected controls can be compromised. In many cases, these acquisition and development 
technology teams do not include resources that understand how technology can be 
attacked, and they do not sufficiently consult external resources with this knowledge to help 
support the design analysis. By the time the separate security team sees the design, 
development is typically already underway. Design weaknesses are left in place because 
they are discovered too late to be corrected without major cost and schedule impacts. 
Challenges for Evaluating Trusted Dependencies 
Security dependencies relate to components that some build for others to use or 
connect with (i.e., inherited risk). The following are known areas of concern for 
inherited/dependency risk: 
• Each dependency represents a risk (e.g., reuse, open source, collaboration 
environments). 
• Dependency and trust decisions should be based on realistic assessments of 
the dependency’s inherent risks and opportunities. 
• Dependencies are not static, so trust decisions must be re-evaluated regularly to 
identify changes that warrant reconsideration. 
• Using shared components to build technology applications and infrastructure 
increases the dependency on and potential mismatch of others’ decisions (i.e., 
supply chain risk).  
Layer on layer of reused software is integrated into systems based on the way the 
software is built and fielded. Code libraries allow developers to quickly assemble 
functionality, reusing language constructs and functionality constructs for frequently applied 
program actions. Tools for automating many of the development and testing steps are 
assembled into integrated development platforms (IDPs) for ease of use.  
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It is cost effective to reuse components and code previously developed for other 
projects to save time in development. However, that material was not created to meet the 
specifications of the current system and could have vulnerabilities introduced by the original 
developer; in these cases, the new system will inherit these vulnerabilities. Reuse practices 
that minimize the impact of this risk must be established. Since the current developers may 
not be familiar with the code, addressing vulnerabilities may be more time-consuming than 
rewriting. In many cases, reuse is not cost effective when total costs are considered. 
The reuse challenge also applies to commercial-off-the-shelf products and other 
third-party code used to address needed system functionality. Shared infrastructures, such 
as cloud environments, fall into this category. In some cases, the responsibility for 
addressing cybersecurity risk falls to programs when they are incorporating reused 
components into the system; sustainment planning for the system must reflect these issues. 
Using patching to address known vulnerabilities must be scheduled in a timely manner to 
minimize attacker opportunities—during both development and operations. In other cases, 
the responsibility of handling the risk must be spelled out in contracts or service level 
agreements (SLAs) established with the provider of services. We see lack of clarity in who is 
responsible for addressing risks from these sources and the timeliness in which 
cybersecurity issues will be addressed. Programs consider cost savings for services without 
establishing the critical mechanisms needed to ensure that the trust relationships that need 
to be established will operate with sufficient cybersecurity.  
A cybersecurity strategy should provide plans for implementing and monitoring 
cybersecurity risk for each type of reuse implemented by a program. (Our experience is that, 
in practice, there is little planned, and response is primarily reactive.) Each plan involves 
establishing a vendor relationship that must be managed. Recent increases in supply chain 
risk show that this is an area where programs need to improve greatly.2 Further information 
about inherited risk is available in an SEI white paper on reducing the attack surface for a 
system (Woody & Ellison, 2020b). 
Challenges for Anticipating and Responding to Attacks 
A growing and diverse population of adversaries uses both simple and increasingly 
sophisticated capabilities to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of 
technology assets. Adversaries often use a combination of technology, processes, 
standards, methods, and practices to craft a successful attack (i.e., socio-technical 
responses). Attacks are designed to take advantage of the ways users normally use 
technology or to contrive exceptional situations where users’ defenses are circumvented. 
Attackers’ profiles, capabilities, and methods are continually evolving. 
To be successful, an attacker must bring together three key pieces: 
• a weakness in the design, coding, or implementation of the system that can be 
triggered to promote unexpected and unwanted execution capabilities that can 
compromise confidentiality, availability, and/or integrity of the system; 
• access to that weakness through connected trusted systems, compromised 
authentication and authorization capabilities, or other attack vectors; 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
2  See the SEI webcast, SolarWinds Hack: Fallout, Prevention, and Recovery (Software Engineering Institute, 2021).  
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• tools that enable the attacker to exploit the weakness, bypass security controls, 
and gain unauthorized system capabilities to trigger unwanted system 
behaviors. 
Much attention is focused on potential vulnerabilities in code, and extensive effort 
has been expended to improve and implement a wide range of code analysis capabilities to 
reduce the availability of weaknesses for attackers to exploit. However, design weaknesses 
introduced in architecture and design implementation represent well over half of the top 25 
common weaknesses and enumerations (CWEs; Common Weakness Enumeration, 2020).  
These weaknesses, which are prevalent in today’s systems and software 
engineering, result from insufficient security requirements and insufficient understanding of 
how that technology can be compromised. Knowledge about the ways that technology can 
be compromised is still rarely taught in college and university curriculums; therefore, it may 
not be a part of the technical knowledge of someone with a background in computer science 
or system engineering.  
As reuse continues to expand (see the “Challenges for Evaluating Trusted 
Dependencies” section above), broad availability of code increases through open source and 
acquisition sources as well as theft. The same tools that can be used to remove weaknesses 
can also be used by attackers to identify unmitigated weaknesses to exploit. There are also 
tools for reverse engineering operational modules to recover the source. Versions of these 
tools are free, so the capabilities available to an attacker to discover and exploit weaknesses 
are extensive. 
With both the level of software and the pool of potential exploits expanding, it is critical 
to update code as soon as new exploits are identified. Too much software was not designed 
and implemented to be effectively maintained for cybersecurity. Costly and cumbersome 
certification processes have not kept up with the realities of attacker capabilities, and some 
system engineers may not understand the attack potential of the software they implement. As 
a result, the cybersecurity strategy is too limited to address the critical realities of system 
vulnerabilities. 
Challenges for Coordinating Security Throughout the Life Cycle 
Assuring the security and resiliency of a system’s mission-critical functions requires the 
following activities: 
• Plan for what might go wrong; develop requirements for misuse/abuse cases 
with corresponding system and software requirements for secure, resilient 
response and operation. 
• Build security and resiliency into the system. 
• Verify that expected security and resiliency characteristics were actually built 
into the system. 
• Establish clear authority and responsibility for coordination at an appropriate 
level in the organization to ensure effective participation and coverage. 
The lack of attention on misuse and abuse cases is increasingly a major gap in 
system requirements. Some programs leverage reusable components and shared platform 
capabilities as they rush to define functionality and identify ways that cost and schedule can 
be reduced to deliver results as quickly as possible. However, in their rush, they often fail to 
sufficiently specify how the system should perform under attack and compromise. Even 
when threat modeling is well established, system requirements lack the sufficient integration 
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of threat knowledge to drive planned capabilities. Reliance is placed on selected compliance 
controls, but these are not tightly coupled with system operational capabilities, leaving gaps 
where unexpected behaviors and attempts to bypass controls are supported. Completeness 
of system capability is assigned to the system engineering team to ensure the system meets 
its requirements. However, from what we have seen, no one is formally given the 
responsibility for developing a complete set of misuse and abuse cases to ensure all 
reasonable threats are addressed.  
With the transition to iterative development and an increased adoption of 
DevSecOps, the development approach and environments now become a permanent part 
of the operational system. These must be in place to support the creation and fielding of new 
functionality and updates for long periods of time. Hence, they must be treated as part of the 
operational environment and hardened sufficiently to ensure they do not become conduits 
for attack of the system and its components. Traditionally, development environments do not 
have this level of rigor applied to them since they were thought of as temporary. For many 
programs, this perception of transience still remains.  
For every system, cybersecurity is not the only critical quality. Reliability, 
maintainability, usability, safety, anti-tamper, and other system attributes, as well as cost and 
schedule, are equally important. Program management must establish how cybersecurity 
experts will collaborate with those addressing these other important attributes to define how 
trade-offs will be managed and identified. Choices that impact mission risk should not be 
made without careful thought and consideration. We see too many programs that fail to 
establish coordination mechanisms among the various groups, managing each attribute and 
determining trade-offs considering only cost and schedule. As a result, mission-critical 
capabilities can be jeopardized. 
Challenges for Measuring to Improve Cybersecurity 
Cybersecurity attributes of critical products, processes, and resources must be identified, 
measured, and monitored throughout the life cycle. The best means for identifying metrics is 
by using the Goal-Question-Indicator Measure (GQIM) method, which identifies and defines 
meaningful indicators that align management, engineering, and improvement with business 
goals.3  
The cybersecurity strategy should describe how a program will measure improvement. 
Opportunities would include the following: 
• Use risk assessments that consider both current and potential threats, 
vulnerabilities, and impacts to identify critical goals for attributes to be measured 
and monitored. 
• Develop and consistently apply well-formed measurement definitions and 
procedures to establish the credibility of the measurement and analysis results. 
• Include all elements of the socio-technical environment that touch engineering 
and acquisition activities (e.g., processes, procedures, products, and 
resources). 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
3  SEI training materials are available for GQIM. For more information, see Goal-Driven Measurement (IGDM) SEMA 
Course on the SEI website (https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetid=635664). 
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• Support measurement with robust engineering planning; define a security 
measurement plan that spans the life cycle, and develop requirements for any 
needed instrumentation. 
Every activity within the life cycle as well as each process and tool can produce data 
to feed a measurement effort. The challenge is determining where improvements in current 
practice would be useful for mission success and identifying the information that can help 
determine if a change has been successful.  
We see programs measuring lots of individual activities, but many programs are not 
defining how these low-level metrics are useful to management to determine if expected 
cybersecurity results will be achieved. As a start, the strategy must define a vision of 
successful cybersecurity for the program. If the team assembled to address cybersecurity is 
sufficiently diverse, there will be several visions of success. The plan must consider ways to 
measure against each of these visions to provide a broader view of the potential goal. To 
date, we have seen many metrics collected, but little planning for what is needed. Common 
activities we have seen include using checklists for compliance and counting vulnerabilities; 
however, these activities alone will not provide a means for measuring cybersecurity 
improvement. 
Summary 
Building a cybersecurity strategy is challenging, and applying it to a system under 
acquisition and development is even more so. We have been working with a broad range of 
acquisition programs to tackle this important need, but changing the existing patterns of 
cybersecurity neglect is extremely difficult.  
A cybersecurity strategy is a critical planning document for program security. It must 
define the actions a program plans to perform to address cybersecurity. The strategy must 
clearly establish who is responsible for its success and the range of personnel resources 
that should be used to support its success. Those who implement the plan are a key 
element to its success. They must be knowledgeable in cybersecurity and system and 
software engineering and sufficiently focused on the need to provide results. They must be 
able to navigate the program’s acquisition and development life cycle and keep the plan 
current with trade-offs that are made across the life cycle that expand potential risk. These 
plan implementers must be invested in ensuring that cybersecurity is addressed for the 
program; they should not just be brought in periodically to glance at materials and sit 
through a few meetings.  
The cybersecurity strategy will not remain static. Recognizing when changes are 
needed is a critical aspect of monitoring change and improvement. Metrics can play a 
valuable role in this aspect. 
The strategy must cover more than just compliance; it must address the system’s 
attack surface and make every effort to limit risks from all forms of technology (e.g., 
hardware, software, and firmware) and all sources of technology (e.g., reuse, third-party 
components, and external services).  
On the whole, programs continue to react to cybersecurity instead of building it into 
all aspects of the system and its life cycle. A well-planned cybersecurity strategy can help 
bridge this gap to support improved mission success. 
We hope this paper will motivate cybersecurity strategy owners to refocus their 
efforts on delivery of effective cybersecurity results. They should ensure the right resources 
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are empowered to drive cybersecurity improvement throughout the acquisition and 
development life cycle. 
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